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The Australian government has taken steps over the past decade to im-
prove the sustainability of government ﬁnances. In particular, the govern-
ment has signiﬁcantly reduced its debt liabilities, avoiding many of the
risks associated with high debt levels. In April 2006, the Australian gov-
ernment announced that it had eliminated general government net debt.
Having reduced net debt, the government’s attention has turned to the
ﬁnancing of broader balance sheet liabilities, such as superannuation obli-
gations to its employees. The government has announced that it will estab-
lish a “Future Fund” to ﬁnance public-sector superannuation liabilities.1
This will assist in relieving future generations of some of the ﬁnancing bur-
den associated with other intergenerational ﬁscal pressures that are ex-
pected to emerge over the medium term.
The creation of the Future Fund raises the signiﬁcant policy question of
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1. These liabilities relate to public sector employees only, not broader social insurance ob-
ligations found in many OECD countries.cial risk. This paper sets out a framework for optimal government balance
sheet management and presents some preliminary estimates of the types of
ﬁnancial assets and liabilities that would reduce overall ﬁnancial risk.2
7.2 The Australian Government Balance Sheet
The Australian government’s Charter of Budget Honesty Act 1998 (the
Charter) highlights the need for governments to manage balance sheet risks.
The purpose of the Charter is to improve ﬁscal policy outcomes by requir-
ing the ﬁscal strategy to be based on principles of sound ﬁscal management
and by facilitating public scrutiny of ﬁscal policy and performance.
The Charter facilitates optimal balance sheet management in two ways.
First, the Charter requires governments to make regular ﬁnancial reports
that comply with external reporting standards, including the Australian
Bureau of Statistics (ABS), Government Finance Statistics (GFS), and
Australian Accounting Standards (AAS). This means the government bal-
ance sheet is comparable across entities and jurisdictions. Second, the
Charter requires the prudent management of ﬁnancial risks, including
those relating to the broader government balance sheet (such as risks re-
lating to the tax base). By requiring transparent presentation of the bal-
ance sheet and eﬀective management of ﬁnancial risks, the Charter allows
the community to hold the government accountable for its ﬁnancial per-
formance.
7.2.1 The Balance Sheet
The Australian government’s general government sector has published a
balance sheet in the budget papers since the 1999 to 2000 period, consis-
tent with international reporting standards.3The balance sheet reported in
the 2004–2005 Final Budget Outlook is reproduced in table 7.1.
The major assets on the government’s balance sheet are: ﬁnancial equity,
mainly reﬂecting the government’s remaining share in Australia’s major
telecommunication company Telstra ($50 billion); nonequity assets, mainly
taxes owed but not yet received by the government ($17 billion); and in-
vestments, loans, and placements, largely deposits at the Reserve Bank
($35 billion). The major liabilities are superannuation liabilities ($91 bil-
lion) and gross debt issuance ($62 billion).
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2. The paper does not discuss the appropriate size of government expenditure, the level or
composition of taxation necessary to fund it, or the optimal size of a net asset portfolio (Fu-
ture Fund) through time.
3. The Charter requires a balance sheet to be published as part of the budget papers (usu-
ally produced in May), the mid-year economic and ﬁscal outlook (by the end of January in
each year, or within six months after the last budget, whichever is later), and at the ﬁnal bud-
get outcome (up to three months after the end of the ﬁnancial year). The Charter requires the
balance sheet to be on the ABS, GFS, and AAS basis. However, the primary budget state-
ments (and therefore all references in this paper) are on a GFS basis.There are two notable aspects to the Australian Government balance
sheet. First, the government has reduced net debt to very low levels—net
debt has fallen from $96 billion (18.5 percent of GDP) in 1995 to 1996 to
$11.5 billion (1.3 percent of GDP) in 2004 to 2005. Having achieved fur-
ther reductions in net debt the government announced, in April 2006, that
it had eliminated general government net debt. This is in stark contrast
with the net debt positions in nearly all other OECD countries (ﬁgure 7.1).
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Table 7.1 Australian government balance sheet, 2004–05 ($ millions)
2004–05 estimate
at 2005–06 budget 2004–05 outcome
Assets
Financial assets
Cash and deposits 927 1,808
Advances paid 19,314 20,199
Investments, loans, and placements 31,066 35,022
Other nonequity assets 17,147 16,772
Equitya 50,895 50,183




Plant, equipment, and infrastructure 8,411 8,209
Inventories 5,299 4,524
Heritage and cultural assets 6,698 7,275
Other nonﬁnancial assets 2,085 2,032
Total nonﬁnancial assets 41,250 42,374
Total assets 160,601 166,358
Liabilities
Deposits held 365 403
Advances received 0 0
Government securities 61,452 62,331
Loans 5,595 5,648
Other borrowing 224 182
Superannuation liability 91,071 91,172
Other employee entitlements and provisions 7,605 8,178
Other nonequity liabilities 28,416 30,423
Total liabilities 194,727 198,337
Net worthb –34,126 –31,979
Net debtc 16,328 11,534
Source: Final Budget Outcome 2004–05, Australian Government.
aThe 2004–05 equity and net worth outcomes include the Telstra shareholding valued at the
closing share price on 30 June 2005.
bNet worth is calculated as total assets minus total liabilities.
cNet debt equals the sum of deposits held, advances received, government securities, loans,
and other borrowing, minus the sum of cash and deposits, advances paid, and investments,
loans, and placements.The reduction in net debt reﬂects ﬁscal surpluses and asset sales over a
number of years. It also reﬂects that these surpluses have been invested in
debt assets. Following the Review of the Commonwealth Government Secu-
rities Market 2002,the government decided to maintain the domestic bond
market to facilitate interest rate risk management by the private sector. The
government therefore maintains a stock of around $50 billion of mainly
long-dated securities, while investing the proceeds of debt issuance in term
deposits at the Reserve Bank of Australia.
The other notable feature about the balance sheet is that the govern-
ment’s most signiﬁcant ﬁnancial liability is public-sector superannuation,
estimated at $91 billion (10.2 percent of GDP) as of June 30, 2005. While
this liability is expected to increase further in the future, a signiﬁcant
portion reﬂects liabilities to past government employees. The Australian
government closed the main public-sector superannuation fund to new
members from July 1, 2005. This means the government will pay the super-
annuation liability for new public servants employed after this date as they
accrue, rather than growing the superannuation liability further. Also, in
2004 to 2005 the government paid $4.6 billion to Telstra and Australia Post
to extinguish remnant superannuation liabilities from the corporatization
of these ﬁrms a decade or so ago.
Despite these policies, the existing superannuation liability is expected
to remain sizable, reaching $140 billion in 2020 (7.1 percent of GDP),
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Fig. 7.1 General government net debt in selected countries (1998–2007)
Source: Budget Strategy and Outlook, 2006–07, Budget Paper No. 1, Australian Treasury.largely due to growth in the superannuation schemes for military and de-
fense employees (see ﬁgure 7.2).4
In response to these ﬁnancial management challenges, the government
has announced the creation of a “Future Fund” with the aim of oﬀsetting
the government’s unfunded superannuation liabilities by 2020. The fund
will assist in increasing the government’s net worth and increasing national
savings. Contributions will be made to the fund whenever the budget is in
surplus. That is, rather than realized budget surpluses being used to retire
debt or build up term deposits at the Reserve Bank as currently occurs,
they will be invested in the fund.
The fund will be established using accumulated cash reserves currently
on term deposit with the Reserve Bank. Additional contributions from re-
alized surpluses and the reinvestment of returns on the fund’s assets will be
needed to meet the government’s target.
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4. Since the liability depends on the ﬁnal salaries of public-sector employees, there are
risks around this estimate. Revaluations of the liability are regularly reported in the budget
papers.
Fig. 7.2 Public sector superannuation liability (2002–42)
aIncludes the Military Superannuation and Beneﬁts Scheme and the Defence Force Retire-
ment and Death Beneﬁts Scheme.
Source: Australian Treasury.7.2.2 Contingent Risks
The government balance sheet provides important information on the 
ﬁnancial performance of the government from period to period. An in-
creasing net worth means that a government is reducing rather than in-
creasing net liabilities on future generations. However, there are many
rights and obligations of government that are excluded from the balance
sheet, mainly because of valuation problems. The most signiﬁcant item
missing from the balance sheet is the primary assetof the government—the
power to tax.5 While this power is limited by such factors as the constitu-
tion, international tax competition, the size and growth of the economy,
the eﬀects of tax rate and base changes on economic eﬃciency and eq-
uity—the taxing power provides strong assurance of the government’s
ability to meet its liabilities.
On the other side of the ledger, certain explicit government obligations
that do not meet accounting standards tests for the recognition of liabili-
ties are also not recorded.6 Under the international IMF GFS framework,
only obligations payable in any event are on the balance sheet, whereas
those that occur only on uncertain events(even if they are probable) are not
(International Monetary Fund 2001:34). Unless presented carefully, this
can lead to misunderstanding of the underlying economic value of speciﬁc
assets and liabilities on a government’s balance sheet. For example, the
Australian government departs from the GFS framework by recording
provisions against expected defaults on student loans in the balance sheet.7
Probably the largest contingent liabilities not recorded on the balance
sheet relate to future pensions and public health costs. However, these ob-
ligations to fund future expenses have an impact on the economy today, as
well as on ﬁscal sustainability. So the Charter also requires the government
to produce an intergenerational report every ﬁve years, which essentially
captures those obligations not recorded on the balance sheet. The last re-
port from 2002 to 2003 projected spending associated with an aging pop-
ulation to require a ﬁscal adjustment of 5.0 percent of GDP by 2041 to
2042, or $87 billion in 2002 to 2003 dollars (Commonwealth of Australia,
1:2002a).
These conceptual and measurement problems mean the government
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5. Problems also exist in valuing substantial heritage assets on the balance sheet, such as
Parliament House and the Australian War Memorial.
6. This paper is concerned only with explicit ﬁnancial risks, deﬁned as rights or obligations
on government established by law or contract. Implicit ﬁnancial risks provide a diﬀerent set
of policy problems, such as policy issues, which are beyond the scope of this paper.
7. The Swedish government budgets by appropriating the anticipated loss from guarantees
for individual risks, ensuring equivalence between traditional outlays and ﬁnancial instru-
ments that transfer risk to the government (Hagelin and Thor 2003). Similarly, the govern-
ments of the United States and the Netherlands explicitly appropriate the subsidy component
of concessional loans and loan guarantees (Schick 2002:90). The Australian National Audit
Oﬃce has valued the potential exposure from other selected ﬁnancial instruments containing
contingent risks—such as ﬁnancial guarantees—at $115 billion (ANAO 2003).balance sheet is not directly comparable with similar private-sector ﬁ-
nancial statements.8 Government balance sheet management therefore re-
quires a diﬀerent framework for determining whether investment strategies
are optimal. In particular, contingent assets and liabilities are likely to have
a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on how best to structure the government balance
sheet to reduce risk and improve ﬁscal sustainability.
7.3 Government Balance Sheet Management
The government balance sheet is a measure of the government’s ﬁnan-
cial position at a point in time. Government balance sheet management is
concerned with how the balance sheet may move through time. Managing
the risks aﬀecting the government balance sheet can assist in avoiding, or
at least ameliorating, sharp changes in the ﬁnancial position ﬂowing from
macroeconomic shocks. In particular, a government’s balance sheet can be
signiﬁcantly aﬀected by contingent risks aﬀecting the tax base. This paper
argues that a government ﬁnancial portfolio—including ﬁnancial assets,
superannuation liabilities, and government securities—can be structured
to reduce the ﬁnancial impact of these risks.
Despite reportedly sound monetary and ﬁscal policies, as well as high
domestic savings rates, many Asian economies suﬀered serious recessions
in the late 1990s (for example World Bank 1993). These recessions were
compounded, if not caused, by the crystallization of contingent liabilities,
particularly around commitments to support exchange rates and banking
systems. Public injections into the banking system after the Asian crisis
more than doubled the size of government debt to GDP in Korea and Thai-
land (Wheeler 2004:105).9 In emerging countries more generally over the
1990s, bail outs to public enterprises and banking systems have con-
tributed more to the build up of government debt than recurrent deﬁcits
(Kharas and Mishra 2001). Indeed, the deterioration in the debt positions
of emerging countries since the 1990s has been largely attributed to inter-
est rate and exchange rate movements and the recognition of oﬀ-balance
sheet and contingent liabilities (International Monetary Fund 2003:117).
For developed nations, managing balance sheet risks may not be as im-
portant in averting crises. However, balance sheet management can be used
to improve the ﬁscal sustainability of government through time (and ulti-
mately, avoid ﬁnancial crises).10 Since governments can rely on taxation to
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8. Indeed, the National Commission of Audit (Commonwealth of Australia 1996) recom-
mended that the term balance sheet be replaced with Statement of Assets and Liabilities to
avoid misleading comparisons with the private sector.
9. Korea’s government debt to GDP ratio went from 10.5 percent to 26.5 percent after the
costs of bank recapitalization, while Thailand went from 14.6 percent to 46.6 percent.
10. There are other potential objectives of debt management policy, such as attempting to
ameliorate the eﬀects of incomplete or imperfect markets (e.g., improving market eﬃciency
through improved risk sharing). However, alternative objectives have a less secure conceptual
basis and some implementation problems (see Missale 1997).ﬁnance themselves, the concept of ﬁscal sustainability must relate in some
way to the expected path of taxation. Fiscal sustainability not only requires
that governments are likely to remain solvent—in the sense that the antic-
ipated path of taxation is reasonable—but that the volatility (or risks)
around that path are not signiﬁcant. The International Monetary Fund is
incorporating country risk analyses into their ﬁscal sustainability assess-
ments for some countries (for example, Barnhill and Kopits 2003). Indeed,
the relationship between taxation and balance sheet assets and liabilities is
central to the economics literature on balance sheet management.
7.3.1 A Framework for Analysis
Intertemporal Budget Constraint
An important conceptual tool for analyzing government balance sheet
management is the intertemporal budget constraint. This budget constraint
requires that at any date the sum of net worth and the net present value 
of taxation be equal to the net present value of government spending.
In this way, the intertemporal budget constraint relates the government
balance sheet in any period to the contingent asset and liabilities that can
aﬀect the balance sheet.11 If current period government spending is higher
than current period taxation, the government can issue debt (or some other
liability). However, this simply means taxes need to be higher sometime in
the future. In this framework, debt (and other liabilities) passed onto the
future are eﬀectively congealed taxation. The intertemporal budget con-
straint requires taxes to rise from their current levels to ﬁnance future an-
ticipated expenses.
Tax Smoothing
Once the limit to future taxation and spending is identiﬁed, the optimal
path of taxation needs to be found. Barro (1979) uses the standard public
ﬁnance assumption that the excess burden of taxation rises by more than
any rise in the tax rate—a doubling of tax rates has more than twice as
many costs. These costs are the loss in overall welfare caused by tax rates
distorting individuals’ and ﬁrms’ consumption choices.
Given anticipated government expenditure, these costs are minimized
through time if tax (deﬁned as a proportion of GDP) is constant, with tem-
porary macroeconomic shocks leading to deﬁcit ﬁnancing and surpluses.
That is, for a given ﬁnancing requirement, a constant tax rate through time
will impose a smaller cost on the economy than would a low tax rate in one
year and a high tax rate in the next. An important implication of tax
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11. In a series of excellent papers (from Bradbury, et al. 1999 and Grimes 2001, onward) the
New Zealand Treasury has used the intertemporal budget constraint to derive the concept of
comprehensive net worth for balance sheet management purposes.smoothing is that it is anticipatedfuture tax rises, rather than simply current
tax rates, which distort economic behavior. For example, if tax rates are ex-
pected to rise signiﬁcantly in the future, investment (and therefore growth)
is likely to be discouraged. This standard result on optimal long-run ﬁscal
policy accords with the Australian government’s commitment of no in-
crease in the overall tax burden from 1996–97 levels.
This result depends critically on assumptions of the excess burden of
taxation.12 In the absence of these costs, there may be no role for govern-
ment to smooth taxes through time, since individuals could adjust their
own portfolios to account for the uncertainty in future tax liabilities. It is
the presence of such costs that gives government balance sheet manage-
ment its power.
Balance Sheet Risk
For a macroeconomic shock that temporarily reduces economic growth,
the government could resort to deﬁcit ﬁnancing by selling ﬁnancial assets
or issuing debt. However, if an unanticipated shock led to a permanent
change in the resources available to government (for example, a fall in the
present value of taxation revenue), the government would need to adjust
ﬁscal policy because deﬁcit ﬁnancing would not be sustainable. Alterna-
tively, governments could attempt to structure their ﬁnancial portfolios to
hedge against such risks.
Bohn (1990) extends the tax smoothing result to incorporate such un-
certainty by imposing a budget constraint across all anticipated states of
the world, as well as across time. Bohn shows that the government can re-
duce the expectation that tax rates will change by holding and issuing spe-
ciﬁc ﬁnancial instruments.13 In particular, an eﬀective budget hedge would
see the government’s ﬁnancial returns vary negatively with tax revenue dur-
ing a macroeconomic shock. For example, the government’s balance sheet
is protected somewhat if it issues debt where repayments fall with eco-
nomic growth and tax revenue.
This framework suggests that the optimal portfolio for a country depends
on the structure of the economy. If an economy is susceptible to supply-side
shocks, where inﬂation and growth move in opposite directions, then nom-
inal debt issuance performs such a role. For example, the real value of gov-
ernment debt falls if an oil shock causes recession and inﬂation. Alterna-
tively, if an economy is subject to demand-side shocks, where inﬂation and
growth are positively correlated, then inﬂation-indexed and variable inter-
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12. If the loss function is linear, then there is no need to minimize the variance in tax rates
(Hansen 2003:9).
13. Bohn (1990) assumes risk-neutral individuals, so the costs relate to the expectation that
taxes will change. For risk-averse individuals, the uncertainty that the government will raise
taxes at times of low ﬁnancial returns (i.e., high marginal utility of consumption) is an addi-
tional cost (see the Appendix in Hansen 2003).est rate debt are better hedges. Of course, ex ante, it is extremely diﬃcult to
form an assessment of the types of shocks an economy will be subjected to
in the future.
7.3.2 Formal Presentation of the Model
Using the model developed by Bohn (1990) we can express more for-
mally the intuition previously outlined.
Individuals are assumed to be inﬁnitely lived and risk neutral, and max-
imize the expected utility derived from all future consumption:
(1) U t   Et∑
j 0
  jct j
where   is a discount factor, and ct j is consumption in period t   j.
Individuals receive a stream of endowments Y t j and pay taxes on en-
dowments at a rate  t. As taxes are distortionary there is an excess burden
of taxation denoted by a convex loss function h( t). Individuals are also
able to trade a given set of assets, so that the individual budget constraint
is given by
(2) ct  ∑
k
pt,kAt,k   Y t[1    t   h( t)]  ∑
k
(pt,k   ft,k)At 1,k
where At,kis the quantity of asset kheld at the end of period t; pt,kis the price
of asset k (denoted in terms of consumption goods); and ft j,k is the stream
of cash ﬂows derived from holding asset k. Individual optimization implies
that expected returns across assets are equal, that is: Et(1   r t 1,k)   1/  for
all k, where r t 1,k   (pt 1,k   ft 1,k)/pt,k – 1. This assumption is nontrivial,
particularly so when we introduce equities into our analysis.
The government can use tax revenues  tY t and issue debt, Bt,k, to ﬁnance
government expenditure, Gt (which we treat as exogenous in this model),
and to meet outstanding debt obligations. The government budget con-
straint is given by:
(3)  tY t  ∑
k
pt,kBt,k   Gt  ∑
k
(pt,k   ft,k)Bt 1,k
The government can choose the type of debt instrument, k, and may be
a net lender or net borrower in any security, as such Btshould be interpreted
as the government’s net liabilities. Following Bohn, we recast the objective
function in terms of government policy by substituting equations (2) and
(3) into equation (1), which gives14
(4) Ut   Et∑
j 0
  j{Y t j[1   h( t j)]}
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14. As in Bohn (1990) we drop exogenous terms for simplicity, as they are irrelevant for de-
riving the ﬁrst-order conditions for optimality.The government chooses an optimal tax rate and debt portfolio to max-
imize individual utility, equation (4), subject to its own budget constraint,
equation (3). In eﬀect, the government’s objective is to choose the structure
of taxes and debt that minimize the expected present value of the excess
burden of h( t). The ﬁrst-order conditions are15
(5) Et[h ( t 1)]   h ( t) for k   0
 Et[h ( t 1)(1   r t 1,k)]   h ( t) for k   0
where k   0 is the risk-free asset. That is, optimality requires that the ex-
pected marginal excess burden of taxation is constant through time.
As in Bohn, we assume a quadratic excess burden, so that the deadweight
loss of a tax rate,  t is h( t)   (h/2) t
2. It follows then from the ﬁrst-order
conditions that an optimal policy requires
(6) Covt(  ˆt 1, r ˆt 1,k)   0
where   ˆt 1    t 1 – E t 1 is the innovation in the tax rate, and r ˆ t 1,k is the in-
novation in the return to asset k. These innovations reﬂect the unantici-
pated components of changes in tax rates or returns.
Equation (6) implies zero conditional covariance between taxes and re-
turns on available securities. That is, if the covariance between innovations
in the tax rate and returns, for a speciﬁc debt, is negative then the govern-
ment could improve tax smoothing by issuing more of this form of debt.
The converse is also true: if the covariance is positive then the government
could improve tax smoothing by purchasing more of this form of debt. This
is the principal conclusion of Bohn—the government should smooth tax
rates across diﬀerent states of the world, as well as over time.
7.3.3 The Optimal Structure of the Government’s Balance Sheet
To estimate the government’s optimal portfolio an expression for the in-
novation in tax rates is required. The innovation in the tax rate determined
by the government’s budget constraint is:
(7)   ˆt 1   (1    )e y   ∑
k
r ˆ t 1,kdt,k  ∑
j 0
  jg ˆt 1 j     t∑
j 0
  jy ˆt 1 j
where yt is the growth rate of real output and y   is its mean. The term
Σj 0  jy ˆt 1 jis the present value of innovations in future growth rates of real
output, where  is the discount factor and y ˆt 1 j Et 1yt 1 j. That is, it cap-
tures unexpected permanent changes in output and therefore in the gov-
ernment’s ability to raise tax revenues at a constant tax rate. Similarly,
Σj 0  jg ˆt 1 j is the present value of innovations in government spending rel-
ative to output, where g ˆt 1 j   (Et 1Gt 1 j – EtGt 1 j)/Y t. The ratio of secu-
rity k debt to output is denoted by dt,k.
Australian Government Balance Sheet Management 235
15. See Appendix 7.A for derivation of the ﬁrst-order conditions.
 The intuition behind equation (7) is that the present value of tax rev-
enues must cover initial debt plus the present value of government spend-
ing. That is, tax rates will need to adjust whenever there are unexpected
changes in the value of government debt, government spending, or output
growth. For a government that is already optimally managing the balance
sheet, the current tax rate already incorporates anticipated obligations.
Substituting the previous into equation (6) gives the optimality condi-
tion for each government security:
(8) ∑
l
covt(r ˆ t 1,k, r ˆ t 1,l)dt,l   covt(r ˆ t 1,k, ∑
j 0
 jg ˆt 1 j) 
  wtcovt(r ˆt 1,k, ∑
j 0
 jy ˆt 1 j)   0
where wt   [ey  /(1 –  )] t is a weighting factor.16
That is, the government can smooth taxes to oﬀset unexpected shocks in
the present value of government spending and output through the issuance
or purchase of state-contingent securities.
As the paper focuses on shocks that aﬀect the present value of output
growth, we assume that the covariance between innovations in the present
value of government spending and returns on assets (the second term in
equation [8]), is zero. The following equation provides us with a solution to
the government’s optimal portfolio:17





where Σr is the variance-covariance matrix of returns (assumed to be non-
singular) and Σy,r is the covariance vector matrix between returns and the
present value of unexpected innovations in real output growth.
Methodology
In order to solve equation (9) and evaluate the optimality of various
portfolios of government assets, we need to calculate innovations in re-
turns and the present value of future rates of growth in real output.
We limit our analysis to a bivariate comparison. For our ﬁrst analysis we
are interested in the optimal share of long-term domestic debt and long-
term foreign debt. We then extend this analysis to consider alternative as-
set classes, such as equities.
The real return on long-term domestic debt, r t 1,d, is inﬂuenced by the
domestic nominal long-term interest rate lt 1, changes in the current long-
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16. For the purposes of the empirical analysis, we assume a discount factor of 0.98 (which
equates to a 2 percent per quarter discount), an average tax rate of 24 percent, and an aver-
age real growth rate of 0.75 percent per quarter. The value of the weighting factor does not
aﬀect any of the qualitative conclusions.
17. For derivation of equation (9) see Appendix 7.B.term market interest rate (which is used as an approximation of the capital
gain component), and domestic inﬂation,  t 1.18 Foreign long-term debt
returns, r t l,f, will in addition be inﬂuenced by the change in the exchange
rate  st 1. Innovations in returns are therefore given by:
r ˆ t 1,d    ( t 1,d   Et t 1,d)   ( t 1   Et t 1)
r ˆ t 1,f    ( t 1,f   Et t 1,f)   ( t 1   Et t 1)   ( st 1   Et st 1)
To calculate these innovations in real returns, vector autoregressions
(VARs) are used to formulate expectations for the inﬂation rate, the per-
centage change in the exchange rate, the long-term domestic interest rate,
and the long-term foreign interest rate. Following Hawkesby and Wright
(1997), expectations are formed for each variable (yt 1,  t 1, lt 1,d,  st 1,
lt l,f) by regressing that variable on a constant and one lag of the variable,
together with long lag of all other variables.19 As expectations at time t de-
pend only on information available up to time t, we must run a new VAR
for each time period.20
The same method is used to calculate innovations in the growth of real
output: y ˆt 1 j   Et 1yt 1 j – Etyt 1 j. Expectations for real output growth
need to be formed at each time period for rates of growth in all future time
periods. That is an expectation that is formed at time t, for (yt 1, yt 2,  ...
yt n) and at time t   1 for (yt 1, yt 2,  ...  yt n) given the additional informa-
tion. The diﬀerences in expectations are then discounted at a rate,   (as-
sumed to be 0.98).21 This process is repeated for each time period to derive
a time series for innovations in the present value of output.
The methodology used to derive innovations in equity returns and out-
put is the same as that outlined previously, with innovations in equity re-
turns given by:
r ˆ t 1,e   (pt 1,f   Etpt 1,f)   ( t 1   Et t 1)   ( st 1   Et st 1)
where p ˆt 1 (p∗
t 1– Etp∗
t 1) is the unanticipated component of capital gains.
Capital gains are calculated using accumulation share indices for each
country, which incorporate both share price growth and dividend growth.
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18. The proxy used for capital gains may lead to an understatement of this component in
the innovation of real returns since it does not take into account the time to maturity. The
longer the time to maturity the larger will be the capital gain (or loss) associated with changes
in interest rates.
19. The lag speciﬁcation was chosen based on the lag length that minimized the Akaike and
Schwarz information criteria. The estimated model does not capture the full range of vari-
ables that could be expected to determine output and inﬂation. For a more complete model
of the Australian economy see Dungey and pagan (2000).
20. This essentially involves growing the sample size with each estimation. We also investi-
gated an alternative approach of rolling the sample, thereby keeping the sample size constant.
However, this did not have a material impact on the results.
21. We also estimated the results using a lower discount factor, which did not change our
broad conclusions. However, the case for investing abroad was slightly weaker under this sce-
nario.Data
All data are quarterly data for the post-ﬂoat period 1983:4 to 2004:3.
Long-term interest rates are the long-term government bond yields con-
verted into quarterly returns. We take the ﬁrst diﬀerence in bond yields, 
as we cannot reject nonstationarity over the sample period (based on the
Augmented Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron tests). Expectations for bond
yields are then derived from summing the expectations of the ﬁrst differ-
ence. Equity returns are derived using accumulation indices when these 
are available and for the periods when they are not, capital weighted share
indices are used (this eﬀectively assumes that dividend growth is constant
over this period). The exchange-rate data are the log diﬀerence of the spot
exchange rate expressed as the Australian dollar price of foreign currency.
Inﬂation is estimated by taking the log diﬀerence of the GDP deﬂator.
Growth rates in output are the log diﬀerences of real GDP.
Results
Table 7.2 shows the variance-covariance matrix for innovations series
using domestic and foreign debt. The results show that innovations in do-
mestic returns and foreign returns vary negatively with innovations in out-
put. This suggests that it is optimal for the Australian government to pur-
chase securities denominated in both domestic and foreign currency. These
results are consistent with the ﬁndings of Hawkesby and Wright (1997) and
Missale (1999).
We also report the optimal portfolio of domestic and foreign debt as a
ratio to quarterly GDP, calculated by solving equation (9). These shares
should be interpreted with some caution, as the magnitudes are sensitive to
the estimation methodology. We discuss some of the key qualiﬁcations in
detail in the following. With this in mind, the results show that it is optimal
for the government to invest a relatively larger amount in domestic rather
than foreign debt. This is largely driven by the volatility in the exchange
rate, which acts as a penalty on foreign investment. Volatility in the ex-
change rate (and therefore in foreign returns) is not necessarily bad, pro-
vided innovations in the exchange vary negatively with innovations in 
output. While this is the case for Japan and Germany, our results show a
positive covariance between innovations in the exchange rate and output
for the United States.22
The previous results can be disaggregated into the various elements that
make up innovations (or unexpected changes) in returns (see Appendix
7.C). Doing so reveals that there is a positive covariance between innova-
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22. The volatility in the exchange may be partly driven by the method used to derive ex-
change rate innovations. Meese and Rogoﬀ (1983) have shown that models used to explain
exchange rate movements over short intervals generally perform worse than a simple random
walk.tions in output and inﬂation, which is a key driver of our results. This im-
plies that periods of unexpectedly low inﬂation (and therefore high re-
turns) have tended to occur during periods of unexpectedly low output.
This may largely result from the early 1990s recession, when inﬂation and
domestic interest rates fell substantially.
Turning now to equities, a priori, we might expect that it would be un-
likely that domestic equity investment would provide an eﬀective hedge
against macroeconomic shocks, given the high correlation between com-
pany proﬁts and output. This is conﬁrmed by our results, which show that
the covariance between innovations in domestic equities and output is pos-
itive (table 7.3).
In contrast, the covariance between innovations in foreign equities and
output is negative, suggesting that an optimal portfolio would include
some investment in foreign equities for the countries considered.
7.3.4 Qualiﬁcations
There are some signiﬁcant qualiﬁcations to our results that require fur-
ther investigative eﬀort. First, the paper focuses on unconstrained portfo-
lios for only a select number of countries. Further work to determine the
optimal constrained portfolio involving multivariate ﬁnancial assets needs
to be undertaken before using the model for policy purposes. For example,
the optimal portfolio suggests that 2 percent of quarterly GDP should be
invested in German shares. This is clearly unrealistic. However, in the ab-
sence of obvious constraints on the portfolio at the time of writing this pa-
per, we decided to report the unconstrained case only. Similarly, Japan,
Germany, and the United States were chosen since they represent the
largest economies in their respective geographical regions of Asia, Europe,
and the Americas.
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Table 7.2 Variance-covariance matrix for innovations series: Debt securities
U.S. Japan Germany
Variance-covariance matrix
Var(rd) 0.32 0.37 0.37
Var(rt) 10.11 41.81 36.95
Cov(rd,r f) –0.21 0.28 0.11
Cov(rd,y ) –0.12 –0.10 –0.04
Cov(rf,y ) –0.02 –0.38 –0.26
Optimal portfolios
Domestic –4.59 –3.17 –1.22
Foreign –0.12 –0.09 –0.08
Notes:The results are for pair-wise comparisons between Australia and the reported country.
This means that a separate VAR is calculated for each country including ﬁve variables: out-
put, inﬂation, nominal domestic bond yield, nominal foreign bond yield, and the percentage
change in the exchange rate.Second, we have ignored the relationship between innovations in output
and government spending. That is, government expenditure is also likely to
be linked to macroeconomic shocks and potentially able to be oﬀset by
government ﬁnancial investment policy. It is likely that the eﬀects of a
macroeconomic shock on spending reinforce the impact on taxation.
However, Bohn (1990) suggests that this impact is likely to be small and in-
signiﬁcant. In theory it should be possible to determine the present value
risk characteristics associated with major expense obligations (such as
health care) and invest in assets to oﬀset these risks.
Third, the results are based on agents forming expectations on future ﬁ-
nancial risks based on past ﬁnancial events. This expectations formulation
deﬁes the rational expectations (Lucas) critique that economic agents
should use all available information when forming expectations—past re-
turns (or risks) are no guide to future returns (or risks) in the presence of
signiﬁcant policy change (Lucas 1976). In particular, Australia has been
subject to signiﬁcant economic reforms over the past two decades, which
may make relying on certain systematic relationships to form expectations
diﬃcult. However, nearly all ﬁnancial models in regular use rely on past
data to measure risks (for example, the capital asset pricing model). Fur-
ther, our results use data from 1983, after the ﬂoating of the Australian dol-
lar, which was perhaps the largest structural change in the ﬁnancial sector.
Finally, the model does not explicitly incorporate the existing stock of
assets and liabilities held by other levels of government and by the private
sector. In Australia, the state governments are in net asset positions (2 per-
cent of GDP in 2004 to 2005), however the private sector has signiﬁcant net
external debt (48 percent of GDP in 2004 to 2005). The current model as-
sumes that the obligations of the private sector and other governments are
independent of the ﬁscal position of the Australian government. By focus-
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Table 7.3 Variance-covariance matrix for innovations series: Equities
Australia U.S. Japan Germany
Variance-covariance matrix
Var(rd) 0.31 0.32 0.34 0.33
Var(re) 206.98 60.30 91.40 204.61
Cov(rd,r e) 0.56 0.35 0.50 –0.10
Cov(rd,y ) –0.04 –0.07 –0.08 –0.05
Cov(re,y ) 0.21 –0.10 –0.18 –0.25
Optimal portfolios
Domestic debt –1.52 –2.49 –2.85 –1.75
Equities 0.02 –0.01 –0.01 –0.02
Notes: The results are for pair-wise comparisons between domestic debt securities and equi-
ties in the reported country. This means that a separate VAR is calculated for each country in-
cluding ﬁve variables: output, inﬂation, nominal domestic bond yield, equity prices (to proxy
capital gains), and the percentage change in the exchange rate.ing only on the explicitassets and liabilities of the central government (i.e.,
rights or obligations established by law or contract), the paper ignores
those that may be implicit (i.e., rights or obligations dependent on moral
suasion). For example, the community may expect the government to take
over some of the ﬁnancial obligations of large ﬁnancial institutions that
would otherwise be subject to failure. These expectations make the dis-
tinction between private- and public-sector debt in the paper (and by in-
vestors) less clear.
One potential way around this caveat is to include the net external obli-
gations of the private sector when determining the optimal government
portfolio.23For example, roughly half of net Australian private-sector debt
is held in U.S. dollars, implying that an optimal portfolio would hold less
of these liabilities if the government were also considering implicit risks on
the government balance sheet. Of course, there may be signiﬁcant moral
hazard type problems for any government that makes this an explicit port-
folio objective (see the discussion on policy endogeneity in section 7.4).
7.4 Discussion
7.4.1 Policy Implications
The key conclusion from the debt management literature is that the op-
timal ﬁnancial investment strategy depends on the types of shocks aﬀect-
ing the macroeconomy. That is, the optimal way to structure debt (short or
long, nominal or price-indexed, domestic or foreign currency) or invest in
ﬁnancial assets is an empirical question. Hansen (2003; following Missale
1997) summarized the main results from this literature:
1. Buy (short-sell) assets whose returns have a positive (negative) cor-
relation to public spending and negative (positive) correlation to the tax
base; and
2. Issue
• nominal debt for government spending and productivity shocks;
• price-indexed debt for monetary and real demand shocks causing
inﬂation;
• foreign currency debt when output and inﬂation shocks are corre-
lated internationally;
• maturity structure of debt to match structure of planned ﬁscal sur-
pluses; and
• short maturity debt when positive correlation between output and
real interest rates.
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23. The model incorporates implicit liabilities to the extent they are incorporated in Gt.
Managing the government balance sheet against implicit obligations is problematic for the
moral hazard reasons discussed in section 7.4.2.1.Our results suggest that the Australian economy has been subject to
more demand shocks than supply-side shocks over the sample period. If
this were to continue to be the case going forward, then the tax-smoothing
framework adopted in this paper suggests that the government should pur-
chase domestic nominal bonds. During high-output periods in Australia,
inﬂation and tax revenues would increase oﬀset by lower real returns on
domestic nominal bonds, such as government (including state government
debt) or high-grade corporate debt. However, during low-output periods,
inﬂation and tax revenues will fall and be oﬀset by higher real returns to
domestic nominal bonds. These results support the government’s policy of
reducing net debt—both by reducing the size of gross debt issuance and in-
vesting in debt assets. The results also suggest that balance sheet risk could
be further reduced by issuing price-indexed bonds (such as treasury in-
dexed bonds), rather than nominal bonds.
Our results also suggest that investing in foreign equities is likely to re-
duce overall balance sheet risk. In eﬀect, the government already has a sig-
niﬁcant stake in Australian equities because of the tax revenue earned from
domestic capital income (not to mention the presumably highly correlated
ﬂow on eﬀects through taxation of domestic labor income). Auerbach
(2004) notes that, even though the U.S. government does not hold much eq-
uity directly, it has signiﬁcant exposure to variations in stock prices through
its claims to future tax revenues. Indeed, Auerbach argues that the U.S.
government’s implicit equity position is larger than the stock market itself,




There are some important criticisms of the tax-smoothing approach that
can aﬀect our policy conclusions. First, there is the potential problem of
policy endogeneity. If the government’s improved ﬁnancial asset perfor-
mance encourages greater government spending then the independence
between government spending and taxing is violated. Similarly, there may
be risks that if the government takes a controlling interest in a domestic
company, some sections of the community may expect increased assistance
for that company. In such circumstances, the optimal balance sheet strat-
egy for government might be to avoid accruing a ﬁnancial asset portfolio
altogether and simply eliminate all risk, balancing the budget through the
cycle (see Pinﬁeld 1998). Another potential solution is to restrict the de-
gree of controlling interest a government investment fund can maintain in
speciﬁc domestic companies. Further, it is unlikely that the Future Fund
will increase the incentive of future governments to spend more on public-
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previously accrued entitlements that are reasonably well deﬁned. Finally,
the government reports its underlying cash surplus exclusive of fund earn-
ings so that they cannot be used for recurrent expenditure.
Moral hazard is a particularly severe form of policy endogeneity that ap-
pears to have limited the use of some ﬁnancial instruments to manage gov-
ernment balance sheets. Traditionally, the economics literature on optimal
debt management has focused on state-contingentdebt. As early as 1941, in-
ﬂation-indexed bonds were seen as a means for removing the incentive of
governments to inﬂate the economy and reduce the real value of their obli-
gations (Bach and Musgrave 1941). However, in the real world there is little
evidence of state-contingent debt instruments being issued by govern-
ments.24 This may primarily be due to some state-contingent debt instru-
ments being subject to moral hazard problems (sometimes referred to as
time inconsistency) if governments can aﬀect the states (Calvo and Guidotti
1990; Bohn 1990). For example, bond returns that fall when an index of gov-
ernment expenditure rises would hedge the balance sheet against economic
downturns. However, governments would also have an incentive to increase
expenditure. This risk would then be priced in the value of such bonds, mak-
ing them unattractive even for well-intentioned governments to issue.
More recently, the literature has focused on hedging the balance sheet by
optimal design of the maturity and denomination of conventional debt se-
curities. For example, a shorter average debt maturity increases the expo-
sure to short-term interest rate rises. Long maturities can avoid exposure
to roll-over (Barro 1995). It is not necessary, as our results show, to issue
state-contingent debt to oﬀset speciﬁc balance sheet risks. Investing in a
broad and diverse range of ﬁnancial assets eﬀectively eliminates moral haz-
ard type problems.
Agency Costs
Second, there are signiﬁcant agency costs associated with government
management of ﬁnancial assets. In the tax-smoothing model, the govern-
ment is assumed to maximize the welfare of all individuals in the commu-
nity. However, in practice the incentives of government and the agents used
by government may not be so aligned. This can lead to poor investment de-
cisions. The solution to the agency cost problem is to ensure that the gover-
nance of the Future Fund is clear and transparent and investments are
made on a commercial basis within the investment guidelines set by gov-
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24. Real-world examples include Mexico issuing bonds tied to oil prices and Costa Rica,
Bulgaria, and Bosnia issuing bonds containing an element of indexation to GDP (Boren-
sztein and Mauro 2002). Even in Australia, the pool of inﬂation-indexed bonds is relatively
small, with outstanding Treasury Indexed Bonds around 10 percent (or $6.4 billion) of total
Commonwealth debt (Commonwealth of Australia 2002b).ernment. Indeed, applying best corporate practice would allow individual
government ﬁnancial entities to set their own strategic asset allocation, af-
ter taking into account the nature of their liabilities (Grimes 2001). This is
likely to improve governance, accountability, and entity performance. In
the case of the Future Fund, this would involve directing the Fund to invest
in assets of a similar risk to the government’s superannuation liabilities.
In dealing with agency costs, the government imposes constraints on the
optimal portfolio. The signiﬁcance of these constraints has been high-
lighted by the results of Fowlie and Wright (1997) for New Zealand. They
found that the optimal ﬁnancial portfolio incorporated foreign-currency
denominated debt when taxes are included, but only domestic debt when
taxes are excluded. This means that a narrow focus only on balance sheet
assets can lead to ﬁnancial investments that increase the chances of volatile
tax changes.
However, this does not mean that ﬁnancial investment decisions should
not be decentralized (down to an agency level) or linked to narrow portfo-
lio benchmarks (such as matching ﬁnancial assets to future superannuation
liabilities). Rather, a single central agency needs to be aware of how indi-
vidual elements of the balance sheet interact with each other during macro-
economic shocks. Some commentators see the centralization of broader
balance sheet risk management with debt management as a logical step
(Currie and Velandia-Rubiano 2002). For example, the Swedish Debt Man-
agement Oﬃce advises government on the costs of contingent liabilities
and the government debt portfolio (Hörngren 2003).25 Such a structure al-
lows natural hedges in the balance sheet to be identiﬁed, reducing the need
(and costs) from individual agencies hedging. Alternatively, such a balance
sheet perspective allows for large cumulative risks to be identiﬁed and
brought to the attention of government (Wheeler 2004:67).
Imperfect Capital Markets
The model discussed in this paper assumes that capital markets are not
perfect; or at least that certain restrictions exist that stop governments
from using ﬁnancial instruments to perfectly hedge balance sheet risk.
While governments can use some existing ﬁnancial instruments to reduce
balance sheet risk, certain types of risks are still likely to remain unhedged.
In particular, incomplete capital markets may mean governments are un-
able to hedge against certain types of risks (such as catastrophic risk).
There may be no private sector substitutes for government bonds (Arrow
and Lind 1970, Stiglitz 1983). If capital markets are incomplete, there may
be gains from governments issuing standardized products that can out-
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25. Other countries where debt managers are integrated with contingent liability manage-
ment include New Zealand, South Africa, and Colombia (Wheeler 2004:24).weigh beneﬁts from state-contingent products (Missale 1997). Alterna-
tively, governments may have other policy objectives, such as maintaining
some debt to allow the development of important ﬁnancial products
(Comley and Turvey 2005). There may also be other reasons for investing
domestically. For example, informational, governance, or tax advantages
may lead to a home country bias for equities (for a review, see Karolyi and
Stulz 2002). Such constraints can limit the ability of government’s move-
ment toward the optimal portfolio outlined in this paper.
Even if capital markets are imperfect, governments can still invest in ﬁ-
nancial assets to the fullest extent possible using available securities. For
the remnant unhedged risks, the government should consider building and
maintaining a positive balance of net worth as self-insurance against large
rare events.26
7.5 Conclusion
The economics literature relating to balance sheet management suggests
that the government’s ﬁnancial portfolio should be structured to reduce
the budget impacts of macroeconomic shocks. More speciﬁcally, an opti-
mally structured balance sheet can reduce the risk that a major macroeco-
nomic shock will see large changes in tax rates. This not only reduces the
distortions caused by volatile tax rates, but increases the ﬂexibility of gov-
ernments to respond to unexpected ﬁscal pressures. A government that in-
vests well has less need to signiﬁcantly raise taxes or cut spending to ﬁnance
itself. In most countries, this has meant structuring the debt portfolio so
that liabilities do not become overly burdensome during recessions. How-
ever, Australia is amongst a small number of countries determining how
best to structure a ﬁnancial portfolio that includes positive net ﬁnancial
assets.27
This paper has shown that it is not only the budget position that is im-
portant for sustainability, but how the ﬁnancial assets and liabilities of gov-
ernment are allocated. Our results support the Future Fund investing in a
broad range of ﬁnancial assets that includes nominal domestic debt and
equities from selected countries. Indeed, by investing optimally the govern-
ment is likely to reduce risks on the budget and improve growth prospects.
Australian Government Balance Sheet Management 245
26. Hansen (2003:11) notes that building a precautionary balance is worthwhile if and only
if the unhedged risks would otherwise result in a negative correlation between tax rates and
consumption.
27. Other OECD countries with signiﬁcant ﬁnancial asset funds (including pension funds)
are New Zealand, Norway, Ireland, Finland, and Denmark (see Comley and McKissack
2005).Appendix A
Derivation of First-Order Conditions
The government chooses taxes and debt to maximize the individual objec-
tive function (A1) subject to its budget constraint (A2).
(7.A1) Ut   Et∑
j 0
  j{Y t j[1   h( t j)]} 
  EtY t[1   h( t)]    Et{Y t 1[1   h( t 1)]}   ...  
(7.A2)  tY t  ∑
k
pt,kBt,k   Gt  ∑
k
(pt,k   ft,k)Bt 1,k
From the budget constraint, we can solve for  1,  t 1, and so on, and sub-
stitute into the objective function, Ut, which can then be maximized with
respect to Bt,k, Bt 1,k, and so on.
The ﬁrst-order condition with respect to Bt,k is:
(7.A3)   Et Yt  h ( t)       Et Yt 1 h ( t 1)      0
Now, from the constraints:
(7.A4)    and,   
Substituting into equation (A3) gives:
Et[ h ( t)pt,k]    Et[h ( t 1)(pt 1,k   ft 1,k)]   0
Since pt,k is known at time t, and  t is chosen at time t, equation (A4) can be
written as:
h ( t)    Et  
Recalling that r t 1,k (pt 1,k ft 1,k)/pt,k– 1, and noting also that the con-
dition that expected returns must be equal implies that for the risk-free as-
set (deﬁned as k 0), r 1/ – 1, then the previous expression will yield the
ﬁrst-order condition obtained in equation (5) of section 7.3.
h ( t 1)(pt 1,k   ft 1,k)
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Derivation of Equation (9)
The optimality condition for each government security k (k   1, . . . , K)
given in equation (8) is:
(7.B1) ∑
l
covt(r ˆ t 1,k, r ˆ t 1,l)dt,l   covt(r ˆt 1,k, ∑
j 0
p jg ˆt 1 j) 
  wtcovt(r ˆt 1,k, ∑
j 0
  jy ˆt 1 j)   0
As discussed in section 7.3 we assume that the second term is equal to
zero and so the previous equation can be reduced to:
(7.B2) ∑
l
covt(r ˆt 1,k, r ˆt 1,l)dt,l   wtcovt(r ˆt 1,k, ∑
j 0
 jy ˆt 1 j)   0
(7.B3)      
  wt  
Rearranging this gives:
(7.B4)   
  wt  
–1
   
covt r ˆt 1,l, ∑
j 0
 jy ˆt 1 j 
. . .
covt r ˆt 1,K, ∑
j 0
 jy ˆt 1 j 
covt(r ˆt 1,l,r ˆt 1,l)  ...  covt(r ˆt 1,l, r ˆt 1,l)
. . .. ... . .




covt r ˆt 1,l, ∑
j 0
 jy ˆt 1 j 
. . .
covt r ˆt 1,K, ∑
j 0




covt(r ˆt 1,l,r ˆt 1,l)  ...  covt(r ˆt 1,l, r ˆt 1,l)
. . .. ... . .
covt(r ˆt 1,k, r ˆt 1,l)  ...  covt(r ˆt 1,K, r ˆt 1,l)
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In our ﬁrst estimations, we restrict ourselves to the analysis of domestic
and foreign currency debt.




We recall that the domestic and foreign innovation of returns is given by
the following equations
r ˆ t 1,d    ( t 1   Et t 1)   ( t 1   Et t 1)
r ˆ t 1,f    ( ∗
t 1   Et ∗
t 1)   ( t 1   Et t 1)   ( st 1   Et st 1)
and deﬁne  s    st 1 – Et st 1,     t 1 – Et t 1, l   lt 1 – Etlt 1, y  
Σj 0  jy ˆt 1 j and denote Cov(x, y)   c(x, y) and Var(x)   v(x). Expanding
equation (B6) we get:
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j 0
 jy ˆt 1 j 
cov r ˆt 1,2, ∑
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Appendix C
Disaggregated Variance-Covariance Matrix of Innovations
Table 7C.1 Variance-covariance matrix: U.S. and domestic currency debt securities
Y   ld  sl e re rd
Y 0.873
  0.108 0.330
ld 0.013 –0.014 0.020
 s 0.089 0.635 –0.106 10.895
le 0.004 –0.006 0.010 –0.078 0.008
re –0.022 0.311 –0.101 10.338 –0.080 10.106
rd –0.120 –0.317 –0.006 –0.529 –0.003 –0.210 0.322
Table 7C.2 Variance-covariance matrix: Japan and domestic currency debt securities
Y   ld  sl e re rd
Y 0.510
  0.072 0.362
ld 0.028 –0.006 0.022
 s –0.326 0.181 –0.109 41.692
le –0.016 –0.010 0.004 –0.063 0.006
re –0.381 –0.171 –0.107 41.574 –0.060 41.805
rd –0.100 –0.356 –0.017 –0.072 0.006 0.279 0.373
Table 7C.3 Variance-covariance matrix: Germany and domestic currency 
debt securities
Y   ld  sl e re rd
Y 0.298
  0.009 0.365
ld 0.029 –0.010 0.022
 s –0.259 0.529 –0.258 37.293
le –0.003 0.014 0.007 –0.155 0.008
re –0.264 0.150 –0.255 36.918 –0.177 36.946
rd –0.038 –0.355 –0.012 –0.271 –0.021 0.106 0.367Table 7C.4 Variance-covariance matrix: Domestic debt and domestic equities
Y   ld  sl e re rd
Y 0.873
  0.108 0.309
ld 0.013 –0.014 0.021
 s 0.089 0.635 –0.106 10.895
le 0.004 –0.006 0.010 –0.078 0.008
re –0.022 0.311 –0.101 10.338 –0.080 10.320
rd –0.120 –0.317 –0.006 –0.529 –0.003 –0.210 0.314
Table 7C.5 Variance-covariance matrix: Domestic debt and U.S. equities
Y   ld  sl e re rd
Y 0.298
  0.046 0.329
ld 0.019 –0.016 0.020
 s –0.104 0.750 –0.103 10.882
le 0.052 –0.680 –0.006 –4.939 59.111
re –0.098 –0.259 –0.093 5.193 54.851 60.304
rd –0.065 –0.313 –0.004 –0.647 0.686 0.352 0.317
Table 7C.6 Variance-covariance matrix: Domestic debt and Japanese equities
Y   ld  sl e re rd
Y 0.319
  0.057 0.337
ld 0.023 –0.011 0.022
 s –0.410 –0.113 –0.136 40.406
le 0.290 –0.160 0.231 –8.798 67.711
re –0.178 –0.609 0.106 31.720 59.072 91.402
rd –0.080 –0.326 –0.011 0.250 –0.072 0.504 0.337
Table 7C.7 Variance-covariance matrix: Domestic debt and German equities
Y   ld  sl e re rd
Y 0.328
  0.014 0.323
ld 0.033 –0.010 0.022
 s –0.540 0.809 –0.235 31.201
le 0.303 –0.074 –0.087 –37.678 249.916
re –0.252 0.413 –0.312 –7.286 212.312 204.613
rd –0.047 –0.313 –0.013 –0.574 0.160 –0.101 0.326References
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